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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the officers' detention of Ms, Holmes violate the

fourth amendment to the United States Constitution?
2.

Did the officers' detention of Ms. Holmes violate

article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution?
3.

Even if the officers lawfully stopped the vehicle in

which Ms. Holmes was a passenger, did they nevertheless violate the
fourth amendment in seizing the roll of paper towels and its
contents since the facts did not fit within the plain view exception?

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
vi.

be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) provides:
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop
and question suspect — Grounds. A peace
officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe
he has committed or is in the act of committing
or is attempting to commit a public offense and
may demand his name, address and an explanation
of his actions.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code
Ann.§78-2a-3(2) (f), whereby the defendant in a district court
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final judgment of conviction for any crime other than a first degree
or capital felony.

vii.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

vs.

Plaintiff/Respondent

:
:

CHARLENE ANN HOLMES

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 880168-CA
Category No. 2

:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Attempted Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8 (1953 as amended).

The

judge found Ms. Holmes guilty on January 15, 1988, on the basis of
evidence received during a hearing on a Motion to Suppress Evidence
held November 20, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and
for the Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, presiding.

See Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of September 17, 1987, Lieutenant William
Gray and Sergeant William A. Shelton of the Salt Lake City Police
Department were on a plainclothes assignment patrolling in an
unmarked police car (T 26).

At approximately 8:30 p.m./ Sgt. Shelton and Lt. Gray
first noted a woman as she stood on the sidewalk on the west side of
1200 South State Street talking to the male occupant of a pickup
truck.

Officers Gray and Shelton, in their unmarked car, pulled in

behind the truck which then drove away.

The woman, whom the

officers later learned was Charlene Ann Holmes, proceeded to walk
southbound (T. 5, 26-27).
As Ms. Holmes continued walking south, Officers Gray and
Shelton observed a car pull into the Veterinary Hospital parking
lot, stopping at the entrance crossing the sidewalk.
turned and talked to the driver.

Ms. Holmes

After a short conversation, the

car departed and Ms. Holmes continued walking south before crossing
the street at the southwest corner of 1300 South and State Street.
She proceeded to walk south to a service station, Wayne's Car Care
Center (T. 6-7, 27).
At Wayne's Car Care Center, the officers observed a male
in a small pickup truck stop and briefly converse with Ms. Holmes.
Ms. Holmes then walked south and as she neared the southern end of
the service station, the second of the three cars which the officers
had earlier seen stop Ms. Holmes pulled into the station.

The

driver again conversed with Ms. Holmes and shortly thereafter she
got into the car (T. 7-8).
The officers followed the car as it headed southbound on
State Street.

At 1700 South, the car turned east and entered the

west parking lot at South High School.
-2 -

The car exited only seconds

later on to 1700 South and proceeded eastbound to 300 East, entering
the east parking lot at South High School.
later and returned to 1700 South.

The car emerged moments

Driving westbound, the car turned

at 200 East, made a U-turn and reentered 1700 South westbound to
State Street.

The car then turned north onto State Street (T. 9-10,

28-29).
At approximately 1500 South and State Street, Lt. Gray
and Sgt. Shelton pulled the car over.

Prior to stopping the car,

neither officer had viewed Ms. Holmes engage in any illegal activity
nor did they observe the driver of the car violate any traffic
ordinances (T. 10, 29).
Sgt. Shelton testified that he and Lieutenant Gray
stopped the car because they figured that a prostitution deal had
been made between the driver of the car and Ms. Holmes.

Sergeant

Shelton speculated that the deal had been made, but that the
occupants of the car had discovered that he and Lt. Gray were police
officers and were thus returning to State Street to drop off Ms.
Holmes (T. 10,29).
Sgt. Shelton, as head of the vice squad, had had no
previous contacts with Ms. Holmes and had no information that she
was a prostitute (T. 17). He testified that his belief that a
prostitution deal had been made was based on his observations that
there is a very high area of prostitution between approximately 800
South and 2100 South on State Street (T. 5-6), that Ms. Holmes
strolled at a very low pace, turning back and looking toward
-3 -

traffic, that she had brief conversations with three different males
(T. 21), and, that the route the car had taken was suspicious (T.
10).
After stopping the car, Sgt. Shelton approached the
driver's side of the car and asked the driver to step out and talk
to him (T. 11). Sergeant Shelton did not take the driver's name,
nor did he note or record the model and make of the car or its
license plate number (T. 24).
Lt. Gray walked up and stood directly behind the car door
on the passenger side where Ms. Holmes was seated (T. 30). Lt. Gray
testified that from his vantage point, he witnessed Ms. Holmes
remove a roll of paper towels from her purse and attempt to stuff
them between the car console and the seat.

Lt. Gray opened the door

and asked Ms. Holmes for the roll of towels.

He reached in and

removed the towels and unrolled them on the roof of the car. He
stated the towels contained two syringes, a spoon, and two small
packets of mayonnaise (T. 30-31).
Lt. Gray arrested Ms. Holmes for possession of a
controlled substance (T. 32). The officers released the driver of
the car.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Ms. Holmes was seized when officers stopped the car in
which she was a passenger for questioning as to whether she and the
driver had made a prostitution deal.
-4 -

Because the officers lacked a

reasonable suspicion to justify such detention, Ms. Holmes' rights
under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution were
violated and the evidence seized should have been suppressed.
The seizure of Ms. Holmes also violated her rights under
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the statutory
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended).
Even if the officers lawfully stopped the vehicle in
which Ms. Holmes was a passenger, the officers nevertheless violated
the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure when they seized a roll of paper towels which were not
visibly linked to criminal activity, and unrolled them without
obtaining a warrant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE DETENTION OF MS. HOLMES VIOLATED THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
The Court in Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1 (1968), referred

to the Fourth Amendment's personal privacy and security safeguards
as "sacred," with no right "more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
-5 -

control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."
Id., at 8-9 [quoting Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250 (1891)].

The protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment

extends to this nation's citizens when they are on public sidewalks
and when they are in their automobiles.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440

U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
A limited exception to the general probable cause
requirement was created by the United States Supreme Court in Terry
when it held that under appropriate circumstances a brief detention
of a person, absent probable cause to arrest, is permissible under
the Fourth Amendment.
(1983).

See also, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491

The Terry Court instructs that this limited exception is

tailored to balance the government's interest in effective law
enforcement against the individual's liberty, privacy and personal
security.

However, in recognizing the essential protections

guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has stressed
that in balancing these competing considerations, a central concern
has been "to assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the
unfettered discretion of officers in the field."

Brown v. Texas,

443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
Thus, in justifying a particular detention, an officer
must be able to point to specific articulable facts which, when
viewed under an objective standard, create a reasonable suspicion
-6 -

that the defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491.
This Court has reiterated the Terry Court's insistence on such a
standard, cautioning that "[a]nything less would invite intrusions
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more
substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has
consistently refused to sanction.

And simple 'good faith on the

part of the arresting officer is not enough....".

State v.

Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.
at 21-22).

This constitutionally mandated "reasonable suspicion"

necessary to justify detention has been codified in Utah law at
Section 77-7-15 Utah Code Ann. (1953).

Trujillo,, 739 P.2d at 88.

The search and seizure limitations of the Fourth
Amendment apply to "investigatory stops" or "seizures" that are less
than official arrests.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17.

The Utah Supreme

Court has held that the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of
its occupants constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the
fourth and fourteenth amendments.

State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123

(Utah 1983); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653. Therefore, Defendant Charlene
Holmes' fourth amendment rights were implicated when Officers Gray
and Shelton stopped the car in which she was a passenger and
detained her.

In this case, the information relied on by the

officers in a decision to detain the defendant did not amount to the
constitutionally mandated reasonable suspicion.

-7 -

It is Sergeant Shelton's testimony that he relied on four
factors to justify a stop and detention of Charlene Holmes.
1.

The officers observed Ms. Holmes on the block of 1200

South State Street which, they believed based on their past
experience, is part of a very high area of prostitution extending
from approximately 800 South to 2100 South on State Street.
2.

Ms. Holmes strolled at a very slow pace and turned

back to look toward traffic.
3.

Ms. Holmes had short, brief conversations with three

different males who were seated in their respective automobiles and
then got into one of the automobiles.
4.

The "suspicious" route of the car in which Ms. Holmes

was a passenger.
It is Sergeant Shelton's testimony that he relied on two
factors to justify the stop and detention of Charlene Holmes.
(a)

Ms. Holmes was in an area frequented by

(b)

Ms. Holmes talked briefly to two different males

prostitutes.

in their automobiles on two separate occasions, and she conversed
briefly with a third male in whose car she was subsequently stopped
and detained by the officers.
The factors enumerated by the officers, singly or in
combination, did not rise to the level indicated in the case law
from Utah, the United States Supreme Court, and other jurisdictions,
to justify the detention of Ms. Holmes under the fourth amendment.

-8 -

Factor 1(a). Both officers testified that they took an
interest in Charlene Holmes because of their belief that the area in
which they first observed her was a "very high prostitution area."
Although there has been little opportunity to analyze the
"high prostitution area" factor in Utah case law, it is most
analogous to the "high crime area" factor which was recently
presented to this Court in State v. Trujilloy 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App.
1987).

In Trujillo, this Court determined that an officer's

decision to stop the defendant was based initially on two factors,
one of which was the high crime factor in the area.

This Court held

that the seizure of the defendant was unconstitutional —

the

detention of the defendant being unreasonable within the meaning of
the fourth amendment.
In State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), the
officer cited the "high crime area" factor as one of the bases for
his suspicion of criminal behavior on the part of the defendants.
The Utah Supreme Court's per curiam decision did not address the
issue specifically, but since the Court held that the information
known to the officer did not justify the stop, it can be inferred
that the high crime area factor was insufficient to justify the
challenged stop.

See also State v. Belanger, 677 P.2d 781 (Wash.

App. 1984).
In State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), the
defendants were seen in a laundromat located in a high crime area at
1:00 a.m.

The officer recognized the defendants from a previous
-9 -

criminal encounter during which a bag of coins was discovered in
their possession.

In this instance, the Court found the initial

stop leading to the arrest as valid.

However, Whittenback is

readily distinguishable from the case now before the Court since the
officer had previously apprehended the defendants with a bag of
coins in their possession and there had been a rash of burglaries in
the area of the laundromat.
In the case now before the Court, no such previous
contact existed.

Sergeant Shelton testified that he had not had any

previous contacts with Ms. Holmes and that as the head of the vice
squad, he had no information that she was a prostitute (T.17).
Consequently, there is no relationship established between Ms.
Holmes1 prior activities and her presence in a "high prostitution
area."
In People v. Bower, 24 Cal.3d 638, 645, 597 P.2d 115, 119
(Cal. 1979), the California Supreme Court in addressing the "high
crime area" factor recognized that many citizens shop, work, play,
transact business, visit, or live in areas that have high crime
rates.

The Court noted that "[t]he spectrum of legitimate human

behavior occurs every day in so-called high crime areas.

As a

result, this court has appraised this factor with caution and has
been reluctant to conclude that a location's crime rate transforms
otherwise innocent-appearing circumstances into circumstances
justifying the seizure of an individual."
omitted).

JEd.

(citations

The court's critical analysis of the high crime area
-10-

factor is consistent with the view that the attributes of a general
social phenomena should not be imputed to an individual.
In State v. Sery, Case No. 860333-CA, slip op., (July 27,
1988) this Court analogized Mr. Sery's arrival from Florida as a
basis for a reasonable suspicion to the testimony in State v.
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), that interstate 15 was often used
by illegal aliens from Mexico.

Id.

at 18. This Court found that

the fact that a person embarked from a flight which originated in
Florida did not amount to an objective fact upon which a reasonable
suspicion could be based just as the fact that a person was
traveling on 1-15 did not support a reasonable suspicion in
Mendoza.

This Court noted:
In Mendoza, the court considered it unlikely that
illegal alien transporters comprised a significant
portion of 1-15 traffic. It seems equally unlikely that
drug couriers comprise a significant portion of the
travelers through Salt Lake International airport,
even of those whose flight originated in Florida.

Id. at 18. Applying the analysis of Mendoza and Sery to the instant
case, it seems just as unlikely that persons who have entered into
illegal prostitution agreements comprise a significant portion of
the people on State Street, and information that a woman was walking
on State Street between 2100 South and 800 South is not a fact upon
which a constitutionally sound reasonable suspicion that a woman was
involved in criminal activity could be based.
In the case before the Court, the defendant, a female,
was walking down the street in an area deemed by Officers Shelton
-11-

and Gray to be a "very high prostitution area"; an area, as
described by the officers, which encompasses approximately fifteen
city blocks, daily the site of heavy pedestrian and automobile
traffic.

A woman should not be subject to seizure simply because

she is present in an area which has a high incidence of
prostitution.

That an area has a high occurrence of prostitution

does not qualify itself as a specific articulable fact imputing a
reasonable suspicion of criminality to an individual woman.
Factor 2.

Sergeant Shelton alone testified that the

defendant's walk and accompanying backward glance were significant
factors in his decision to stop and detain her.

The allegedly

suspicious walk of Ms. Holmes was no more than her walking at a very
slow pace, or "strolling" and looking back towards traffic —

as

described by Sergeant Shelton. (T.21)
Although this Court has "acknowledged] that a trained
law enforcement officer may be able to perceive and articulate
meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the
untrained observer," and furthermore, "[t]he officer is entitled to
assess the facts in light of his experience."
88-89; United States v. Mendenhall,

Trujillo, 739 P.2d at

446 U.S. 544, 564-565 (1980),

this Court has also re-emphasized that it is "imperative that the
facts be judged against an objective standard[ ]" which would
"warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the
action taken was appropriate!.]" Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 88. (Emphasis
added.)

-12-

Sergeant Shelton's interpretation of Ms, Holmes' walk and
alleged head movements is purely subjective.

There is no objective

standard which one could possibly utilize to determine whether one
was strolling, walking at a very slow pace, at just a slow pace, at
a slow pace, at a medium pace, at a fast pace.

Assuming arguendo

that there is probative value in such a determination, it would fail
the objective test as enunciated by the Terry Court and followed by
this Court.
Indeed, the subjective nature of Sergeant Shelton's
observation of Ms. Holmes' walk and the conclusions derived
therefrom, is illustrated by the testimony of his partner that
evening.

Lieutenant Gray stated that although in his opinion she

walked a little slowly, there was otherwise nothing unusual about
her walk.

The following exchange occurred during cross-examination

of Lieutenant Gray:
Q.

Did you see her (Ms. Holmes) walk down State Street?

A.

Yes

Q.

Did she walk in a normal fashion?

A.

She walked a little slow, in my opinion, but
other than that, nothing unusual.

(T.35)

Q.

Okay, no flirting gestures?

A.

Not that I observed.

Lieutenant Gray's opinion that there was nothing unusual

about Ms. Holmes' walk and his lack of reliance on the manner in
which Ms.Holmes walked down the street to justify the determination
-13-

to stop and detain Ms. Holmes is strengthened by his twenty years
experience in police work.
The unordinary "pace" and "meaning" of Ms. Holmes1 walk
is entirely subjective and not an objective indication of criminal
intent to be used to justify police detention.

To find otherwise

could conceivably subject every law-abiding citizen to the
"unfettered discretion" of law enforcement officials, in violation
of the fourth amendment.
Factor 3b.

Both officers testified that their interest

in Ms. Holmes was aroused because they observed her having short,
brief conversations with three different males seated in their
respective automobiles and that Ms. Holmes got into one of the
automobiles.
Ms. Holmes' "brief conversations" as a basis for the
formation of an articulable suspicion on the officers' part is
similarly subject to the objective difficulties discussed above. As
to these brief conversations, Sergeant Shelton testified that as Ms.
Holmes walked down the street, three separate cars pulled up
alongside her and they briefly conversed.

Sergeant Shelton

testified in regard to these conversations that Ms. Holmes did not
motion to any car or wave the cars over; Ms. Holmes did not yell at
the cars; nor did they observe Ms. Holmes initiate the
conversations.

(T. 18-20).

Sergeant Shelton further testified that he could not hear
anything that was said in the conversations;
-14-

he did not know the

identity of Ms. Holmes or the identity of any of the three different
drivers; he did not know what occurred in the conversations prior to
Ms. Holmes' ride in the car. JCcL

The

result is that the officers

lacked an objective basis to formulate an articulable suspicion
arising from separate conversations between four unknown
individuals.

According to the officers' testimony/ at no time did

they possess any knowledge as to the purpose, context, or content of
the conversations "observed" between Charlene Holmes and the three
individuals.
Ms. Holmes was engaged in short conversations with three
men in cars as she walked down State Street, an occurrence which is
not at all peculiar as pointed out by Sergeant Shelton during
cross-examination:
Q.

You [Sergeant Shelton] have driven up and down
State Street a number of times, I take it?

A.

A lot, yes.

Q.

It is not unusual at all on any night of the
week to see a young woman talking to other
people in cars, is it?

A.

No.

Q.

Happens hundreds of times from 3rd South to 21st
South on State Street every night of the week?

A.

I can't talk about 21st to 3rd.

I am not really

that familiar with that part of the street.
is out of my jurisdiction.

-15-

That

Q.

Well, within your jurisdiction, whatever that is.
It is the kind of thing that happens hundreds of
times a night on State Street, does it not?

A.

Yes, it does.

(T. 20-21)
Objectively, there is nothing to distinguish the brief
moments of conversation between the defendant and the three drivers
from "the kind of thing that happens hundred of times a night on
State Street."

(JEcL ) The fourth amendment acts essentially as a

standard of "reasonableness" in order to guard "the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions" by government
officials, including law enforcement agents.

Prouse, 440 U.S. at

653-654.
In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 52, the Court concluded
that there were no adequate grounds to form a reasonable suspicion
that the defendant was engaged in criminal conduct because, "[i]n
short, the [defendant's] activity was no different from the activity
of other pedestrians in that neighborhood."
P.2d at 90.

rd.;

See Trujillo, 739

There was no knowledge provided to the officers from

Ms. Holmes1 alleged conversations by which one could reasonably
differentiate Ms. Holmes from other pedestrians in the area.
Evaluated under an objective test, the alleged conversations between
Ms. Holmes and the three drivers do not give rise to a reasonable
suspicion.
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Sergeant Shelton stated that the route taken by the car
in which Ms. Holmes was a passenger contributed to his decision to
stop the vehicle and detain the passengers.

Sergeant Shelton

testified that the car's route also included momentarily pulling
into two different parking lots.

Sergeant Shelton further testified

that he did not observe the car make any traffic violations (T.
22).

On the other hand, Lieutenant Gray's testimony did not specify

that the route of the automobile in question was relied upon by him
to justify the stop and detention of Ms. Holmes (T. 29, 36-37).
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674
(Utah 1986) was presented with the stop of an automobile in which
one of the factors claimed to justify the stop and detention was the
manner in which the car was driven.

The officer observed the slow

moving carf with out-of-state license plates at 3:00 a.m. in an area
in which a recent rash of burglaries had occurred.

The Court's

analysis took into account the fact that the officer had not
observed any criminal or traffic offense while he followed the car
for three blocks.

It was the Court's finding that the officer had

no objective facts on which to base a reasonable suspicion that the
car's two occupants were involved in criminal activity.
In State v. Mendoza,

748 P.2d 181 (Utah, 1987), the Utah

Supreme Court directly addressed the "route of travel" factor
stating that "it had little probative value in determining if the
officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle."
4.

Id.

at

Furthermore, the Court noted that the "erratic driving behavior"
-17-

(the subsequent lane change and rapid deceleration at the approach
of the patrol car) could not be interpreted to give rise to a
suspicion that the occupants of the car were engaged in illegal
activity.

J^d. at 4-5.
In Sery, the Court compared the State's reliance on Mr.

Sery's behavior in sitting down in a phone booth twice then standing
up and looking over the partition, and subsequently leaving the
booth by a "strange" path to the State's reliance on an "erratic"
driving pattern in Mendoza.

Sery, slip. op. at 19.

This Court

determined that Mr. Sery's behavior did not amount to an objective
fact upon which a reasonable suspicion could be based, pointing out
that the officer "did not say how this behavior varies from that of
any other arriving

passenger . . .". Id.

In the present case, the officers observed the car in
which Ms. Holmes was a passenger in an area of heavy traffic.
Neither officer observed any criminal behavior before or after the
car turned from the south bound direction on State street to the
north bound direction on State Street when they stopped the car.
The officers did not articulate any objective facts to support the
speculation that the manner in which the car was driven served to
provide a reasonable suspicion that a "prostitution deal" had been
made between Ms. Holmes and the driver of the car or that the car
was driven any differently from other cars cruising State Street. In
fact, Sergeant Shelton testified the he pulled the car over because
he "figured" that a prostitution deal had been made and that the
-18-

driver had decided that they were police and he was going to return
and drop off Ms. Holmes.

Sergeant Shelton acknowledged that his

scenario was conjecture on his part (T. 10). In addition the car
was unmarked and the officers were in plain clothes suggesting it
was difficult for the occupants of the car to have known they were
being followed by officers if, in fact, they realized that they were
being followed at all.1

Furthermore, it is indicative of the nature

of the stop that the officers released the driver without getting
his name, the

model and make of the car, and the license plate

number (T. 24).
The four factors relied upon by the officers to justify
the stop and detention of Ms. Holmes, when analyzed singly, do not
constitute specific articulable facts which create a reasonable
suspicion that a crime had taken place or was about to take place.
Furthermore, nothing concerning the cumulation of the factors makes
them more persuasive in support of a conclusion that the officers1
suspicion was reasonable under the fourth amendment.

The specified

factors do not "mysteriously become imbued with an aura of guilt
merely by viewing them in their totality.
arithmetic, still equals zero."

Four times zero, in

People v. Loewen 35 Cal.3d 117, 672

P.2d 436, 444 (Cal. 1983) (quoting People v. Gale

9 Cal. 3d 788,

511 P.2d 1204 (Cal. 1973) (dis.opn. of Mosk, J.))

1

The State offered no testimony that either Ms. Holmes
or the driver turned around to look at them or repeatedly checked
the rear view mirror.
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Because the officers' detention of Ms. Holmes was not
supported by a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, the
detention violated the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution.

It is well settled that when the seizure and

detention of the defendant is without the evidentiary justification
required by the fourth amendment of the Constitution, the resulting
evidence from the misconduct must be excluded from criminal trials.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.

See also Trujillo,

739 P.2d. 85 Utah App.

1988).
Accordingly, the evidence obtained from Ms. Holmes should
have been suppressed.

Ms. Holmes respectfully requests that such

evidence be suppressed, her conviction reversed, and the matter
remanded for dismissal or a new trial without the illegally seized
evidence.

POINT II. THE DETENTION OF MS. HOLMES VIOLATED
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah is free to analyze search and seizure cases under
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution differently from case
-20-

law which is based on an interpretation of the fourth amendment to
the United States constitution.

In State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127

(Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court inferred that a separate
analysis of search and seizure cases under the Utah Constitution,
article I, section 14 is warranted.

IQ. at 129 n.l.

See also State

v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986).
In State v. Myrick, 688 P.2d 151, 153 (Wash. 1984), the
Washington Supreme Court characterized the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the federal constitution as "guidance" in
construing the Washington Constitution.

The Myrick Court stated

that, "[w]hile we may turn to the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the United States Constitution for guidance in establishing a
hierarchy of values and principles under the Washington
Constitution, we rely, in the final analysis, upon our own legal
foundations in determining its scope and effect."

Id.

Illustratively, the Washington Supreme Court found that the
Washington Constitution provided greater protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures by police to the people of
Washington than did the federal constitution.

State v. Jackson, 688

P.2d 136, 143 (Wash. 1984) .
Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that it
should "construe Alaska's constitutional provisions such as Article
I, Section 14 as affording additional rights to those granted by the
United States Supreme Court under the federal constitution."
v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 321 (Alaska 1985).
-21-

state

In Jones, the Court

approved a more rigorous test to determine probable cause under
Alaska law than is required under the federal constitution.
Assuming arguendo that the factors relied upon by the
officers supported a detention of Ms. Holmes not in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution, this Court may
impose a more rigorous test to determine what constitutes reasonable
suspicion under the Utah constitution.

The facts of the present

case should not support a justifiable intrusion of the protections
granted to Ms. Holmes under article I, section 14 of the Utah
constitution and thus the evidence that flowed from the unlawful
seizure should have been suppressed.

POINT III. EVEN IF THE STOP WERE LAWFUL, THE OFFICERS
VIOLATED MS. HOLMES1 RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND
SEIZURE WHEN THEY SEIZED THE ROLL OF PAPER TOWELS AND
UNWRAPPED IT.
Assuming arguendo that the officers made a rightful stop
and that consequently Lieutenant Gray was in a position where he was
entitled to be, evidence obtained was nevertheless the result of an
illegal search and seizure.
In State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court held that "warrantless seizures and searches are per
se unreasonable unless the exigencies of the situation justify
exception."
(1967);

an

J[<3. at 123, citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347

see also State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983); State

v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981).

One exception specified by the
-22-

Cole Court to the warrant requirement is the doctrine that "objects
within the plain view of an officer from a position where he is
entitled to be are not the subject of an
unlawful search."

Cole, 674 P.2d at 123 [citations omitted].

The "plain view doctrine" requires (1) lawful presence of
the officer which is incident to a lawful intrusion; (2) evidence
which is in plain view; and (3) evidence which is clearly
incriminating.

State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986); State

v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983).

The Kelly Court further

explained that the third requirement that evidence be "clearly
incriminating" means that there is "probable cause to associate the
property with criminal activity."

Kelly, 718 P.2d at 390 (quoting

Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-742 (1983) (plurality opinion)).
Probable cause requires that an officer "have a reasonable belief
that the object viewed may be contraband or stolen property or
useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that
such a belief be correct. . . " Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742.
The object viewed by Lieutenant Gray consisted of a roll
of paper towels (T. 31). In his testimony, Lieutenant Gray attached
special significance to the paper towels and a roll of paper towels
alone does not provide probable cause to associate the towels with
criminal behavior.

The only basis for a finding that the paper

towels were "clearly incriminating evidence" provided by Lieutenant
Gray to justify his seizure was that he "felt she (Ms. Holmes) was
attempting to hide something from us."
-23-

IQ.

The inference from the

officer's testimony is that the paper towels became "clearly
incriminating evidence" from his observation of Ms. Holmes removing
the towels from her purse and "stuffing" them between a console and
the car sear (T. 30).
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), this
Court examined a "furtive movement" subsequent to the approach of a
police officer.

In Trujillo, the officer saw the defendant shift

his knapsack from his side to his front in a way considered by the
officer to be an effort of concealment.

When the officer

approached, the defendant placed the knapsack next to a garbage can,
an act which the officer regarded as an effort to "stash" the
knapsack.
This Court noted that the officer did not observe Mr.
Trujillo engage in any criminal conduct nor did the officer inquire
about the "suspicious" placement of the knapsack before subjecting
Mr. Trujillo to the search which yielded a concealed weapon.
Furthermore, this Court pointed out that the officer never
articulated what concerned him about the knapsack.

J^d.

at 86-89.

In the present case, the officers did not observe Ms.
Holmes engage in any criminal conduct, nor did Lieutenant Gray
inquire about the "suspicious" placement of the paper towels before
reaching inside the car and taking them.
Trujillo,

Similar to the facts of

the officer only articulated a suspicion that Ms. Holmes

was "attempting to hide something from us" to justify the seizure
and search of the paper towels (T. 31).
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The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Texas v.
Brown 460 U.S. 730 (1983), suggests that an officer must articulate
more than a subjective interpretation of a furtive movement in order
to justify a seizure.

In Brown, the officer testified that his

seizure of a balloon from the defendant was based on his knowledge
that balloons tied in the manner of the one seized were frequently
used to carry narcotics.

The officer's testimony of illicit drug

practices was corroborated by a police department chemist.

In

addition, the seizure was based on other contents of the car which
further suggested possession of illicit substances. _ld. at
742-743.

In the instant case, where the visible item itself was not

tied to criminal activity and the officer articulated only a
subjective interpretation of an action, the seizure of the roll of
paper towels and all articles within was not justified.
Assuming arguendo that the seizure of the rolled up paper
towel was legal, the officer effected an illegal search by unrolling
the paper towels on the roof of the car in order to ascertain its
contents.

A closed container may not be opened without a warrant,

even when the container is in plain view and the officer has
probable cause to believe contraband is concealed within.

United

States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In his concurrence in Brown,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stevens wrote:
"if there is probable cause to believe it
contains contraband, the owner's possesory
interest in the container must yield to
society's interest in making sure that the
contraband does not vanish during the time
-25-

it would take to obtain a warrant. The item
may be seized temporarily. It does not follow,
however, that the container may be opened on
the spot. Once the container is in custody,
there is no risk that evidence will be destroyed
Some inconvenience to the officer is entailed
by requiring him to obtain a warrant before
opening the container, but that alone does not
excuse the duty to go before a neutral magistrate.
(Emphasis added.)
Brown, 460 U.S. at 749-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Nor do the contents of the rolled paper towel in the
present case fall within the distinctive configuration variation of
the plain view doctrine.

Pursuant to the "distinctive configuration

variation" the contents of a container are considered to be within
the searching officer's view because the distinctive configuration
of the container proclaims its contents.

State v. Cole, 674 P.2d

119, 124 (Utah 1983); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
The Cole Court found that a gun case inferred its contents due to
its distinctive configuration.

Cole, 674 P.2d at 124; Arkansas v.

Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
The contents of the rolled paper towel could not be
ascertained by its configuration.

A rolled paper towel could

contain an infinite variety of items, if anything at all.

Thus, the

rolled paper towel does not invoke the distinctive configuration
variation of the plain view doctrine.

Therefore, Lieutenant Gray,

even if justified in the seizure of the paper towels, effected an
illegal search by not then obtaining a warrant to ascertain the
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contents of the rolled towel as was within his power and which is
required by the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.
Accordingly, the evidence obtained from within the rolled
paper towels should be suppressed and Ms. Holmes requests that her
conviction be overturned and the case remanded for a new trial
absent the illegally seized evidence, or dismissal.

CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Holmes
requests this Court to reverse the conviction and the trial court's
ruling on the motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial
court with an order to suppress the evidence, and dismiss the
charges or provide for a new trial without such evidence.

Respectfully submitted this

//^)

day of August, 1988.

Qr/Lu-u—.
C. BRADSHAW
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

^dfo-e.Ldsx
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I, JOAN C. WATT hereby certify that ten copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme court, State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and four copies to the Attorney
General's Office 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84114, this

day of August, 1988.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED by

this

August, 1988.
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ADDENDUM A

JAMES C. BRADSHAW, #3768
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-v-

Case No. CR87-1379
JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA

CHARLENE HOLMES,
Defendant,

The defendant, CHARLENE HOLMES, by and through her attorney
of record, JAMES C. BRADSHAW, hereby moves this court to suppress
all evidence obtained by the State in this case subsequent to the
time that the defendant was illegally stopped and detained by the
police officers on September 17, 1987 in violation of her State and
Federal constitutional right to be free from illegal searches and
seizures.
Therefore, the defendant requests that this court suppress
all evidence in the above entitled case.

/7f(
DATED this

/£

day of November, 1987.
Respectfully Submitted,

Uio>,'
I W I1d3 V.;Ji

C. BRADSHAW
:torney for Defendant
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NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
Please take notice that the above entitled hearing will be
heard before the Honorable JAMES S. SAWAYA at his courtroom on

the &Jtt day of

V W W M .

1987, at the hour of

9:00

jC.m.

Please govern yourselves accordingly.
DATED this

7ft

l^-1

day of November, 1987.

ES C. BRADSHAW
torney for Defendant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the
County Attorney, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this

day of November, 1987.
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